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LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING CHILDREN
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr.*
I. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR
A. Juvenile Delinquency
The past year was significant on several fronts where delin-
quency was concerned. The General Assembly responded positively
to fifteen years of advocacy for a separate administrative agency to
deal with delinquent youths. There were several important Vir-
ginia decisions governing the transfer process in an era of growing
concern about serious offenses by juveniles, and the Supreme
Court of the United States brought some closure to constitutional
attacks on the death penalty for minors.
The first of these milestones occurred through legislative action
in response to a General Assembly study of the Division of Youth
Services of the Department of Corrections.' The joint legislative
study committee successfully recommended that: the General As-
sembly separate the Division of Youth Services out of its current
placement in the Department of Corrections and create a new,
free-standing Department of Youth Services effective July 1, 1990,
a director for the new Department be appointed by the Governor
prior to July 1, 1989, a policy-making board for the new Depart-
ment similarly be created effective July 1, 1989, and a sum of
money be appropriated to effect the transition from a division to a
department over the course of the 1989-1990 fiscal year.' There
will be a year of transition in implementing the separation of
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.A., 1959,
Washington and Lee University; L.L.B., 1961, Washington and Lee University.
1. JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE STUDYING DIvISION OF YOUTH SERVICES, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR
& THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF 1989, (S. Doc. No. 21 (1989)) [hereinafter YOUTH SERVICES
REPORT].
2. For a complete list of all of the statutory changes, see 1989 Va. Acts 739, which has
been codified in the following sections: VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-1.1, 2.1-1.3, 2.1-1.6, 2.1-20.4,
2.1-51.18, 2.1-121, 2.1-700 to 701, 2.1-703, 9-6.25:2, 9-168, 9-268, 9-271, 16.1-222, 16.1-228 to
16.1-233, 16.1-238, 16.1-240 to 241, 16.1-246, 16.1-275, 16.1-279, 16.1-284.1, 16.1-286 to 287,
16.1-294 to 295, 16.1-300, 16.1-309 to 311, 16.1-318, 18.2-64.1, 18.2-473, 18.2-480.1, 20-48 to
49, 22.1-340 to 341, 23-35.3, 29.1-317, 36-99.4, 53.1-31, 54.1-2969, 63.1-248.16, 63.1-314.3, 66-
1 to 35 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
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Youth Services from Corrections. Youth Services will have the re-
sponsibility of administering the state-operated court service units
providing probation and other services to the juvenile courts in the
state, the operation of all juvenile correctional facilities, the ad-
ministration of juvenile group homes and other similar commu-
nity-based institutions, the development of programs for the pre-
vention of delinquency, and other similar functions.3 The patrons
argued that the development of a separate agency would heighten
the visibility of programs for delinquent youths and others at risk
of delinquent behavior, and provide an administrative framework
for delivering services to such juveniles in a more efficient and ef-
fective manner.4
In the waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction area, the court of ap-
peals decided three cases that will have a significant impact on the
procedures used by the Commonwealth to transfer a juvenile to
the circuit court to be tried as an adult when a fifteen-year-old is
charged with an act that would be a felony if committed by an
adult. Virginia law provides for the possibility of such transfer at
the discretion of the juvenile court judge when the prosecution ini-
tiates the process by moving for transfer. The Code of Virginia
specifically delineates a procedure for the Commonwealth to seek
review of a decision by the juvenile court judge to retain jurisdic-
tion and not transfer the case, 6 but no corresponding statutory
procedure exists for review at the instance of the juvenile of a deci-
sion to transfer. However, in Grogg v. Commonwealth, the court
of appeals agreed with the juvenile defendant that he had a similar
right to review of the transfer decision by the circuit court, and
that this review should be conducted de novo with the circuit court
making "an independent determination to remand the case to the
juvenile court or to permit the Commonwealth's attorney to seek
an indictment."" At such a de novo hearing, the "burden of proof
remains on the Commonwealth to establish probable cause to be-
lieve that the child committed the act alleged and the other factors
which must be considered by the court pursuant to Code § 16.1-
269."1 The review may be based on the record created in the juve-
3. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 66-1 to 35 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
4. YOUTH SERVICES REPORT, supra note 1, at 6-9.
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269 (Rep. Vol. 1988).
6. Id. § 16.1-269(E).
7. 6 Va. App. 598, 371 S.E.2d 549 (1988).
8. Id. at 606, 371 S.E.2d at 553.
9. Id. The court's conclusion about the burden of proof is also significant because it inti-
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nile court, but it must be an independent determination of the
propriety of waiver by the circuit court judge.
The Grogg conclusion that the transfer decision is appealable
was subsequently reinforced in Hairfield v. Commonwealth.10 The
court concluded that a juvenile court decision to transfer the minor
for trial as an adult is a final order which is immediately appeala-
ble because it ends the juvenile court's jurisdiction." On appeal in
the circuit court, the juvenile has a right to a separate hearing on
the transfer decision at that level, with the court being required to
make all the necessary findings that the juvenile court must make
under the Code of Virginia. 2 If the circuit court judge affirms the
juvenile court's transfer decision, the parties have the same right
to a new judge to hear the merits of the case as exists in the juve-
nile court.'" The court in Hairfield also reaffirmed the conclusion
that the failure of the juvenile court to specifically indicate that all
the necessary findings pursuant to section 16.1-26914 had been
made renders the transfer order void and deprives the circuit court
of jurisdiction over the juvenile.'5
In Hutcherson v. Commonwealth,16 the court of appeals ruled
that the necessary finding in certain cases that a child is not "ame-
nable to treatment or rehabilitation as a juvenile through available
facilities'" before ordering transfer for trial as an adult, for certain
offenses, does not require that the "juvenile has previously been
offered treatment or rehabilitation and has failed to respond."' 8
Thus, a finding of nonamenability may be based on the nature of
the offense and the surrounding circumstances, even though the
mates that the Commonwealth has the burden of establishing each of the statutory criteria
in order to obtain a transfer.
10. 7 Va. App. 649, 376 S.E.2d 796 (1989).
11. Id. at 654-55, 376 S.E.2d at 799-800. The court noted that a juvenile who has been
transferred loses the right to be detained separate and apart from adult offenders and his or
her court records are no longer protected from public inspection.
12. Id. at 656-57, 376 S.E.2d at 800-801.
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 652, 376 S.E.2d at 797; see also United States v. Blevins, 802 F.2d 768, 770 (4th
Cir. 1986); Matthews v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 358, 361, 218 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1975); Pey-
ton v. French, 207 Va. 73, 80, 147 S.E.2d 739, 743 (1966); Commonwealth v. Blevins, 13 Va.
Cir. 110 (1988). It is quite easy to make the requisite findings now, as it is only necessary to
check the appropriate boxes on the pre-printed form provided by the courts entitled Order
of Transfer.
16. 7 Va. App. 534, 375 S.E.2d 403 (1989).
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269(A)(3)(b) (Repl. Vol. 1988).
18. 7 Va. App. at 536, 375 S.E.2d at 403.
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juvenile had not been previously before the court. However, such a
finding may not be based solely on the face of the charge, unless
the offense is one of the specifically enumerated offenses in the
statute. It should also be noted that the issue in Hutcherson was
raised in the circuit court through a "motion to quash the trans-
fer" rather than by an appeal of the juvenile court's transfer deci-
sion, although the latter procedure would have been easier since
Grogg and Hairfield.
Although section 16.1-271 of the Code of Virginia notes that trial
of a juvenile as an adult following transfer shall not preclude treat-
ment as a juvenile for subsequent offenses, a 1989 amendment pro-
vides that a minor who is tried and convicted as an adult in the
circuit court and sentenced to confinement in a state correctional
facility shall be considered an adult in any criminal proceeding re-
sulting from an offense while so incarcerated. 9
The Grogg case also presented a difficult confession issue for the
court of appeals.20 Grogg, nine days short of his sixteenth birthday,
was initially arrested in Sarasota, Florida, on the evening of Octo-
ber 26, 1985, and placed in jail pending an "advisory proceeding"
before a circuit court judge the next morning. 21 He was advised of
his rights and gave a Florida police officer a statement which was
not introduced at his trial. A public defender was appointed prior
to the "advisory proceeding" to represent him, along with about
fifteen to eighteen adults at the hearing, and this attorney was sur-
prised to find Grogg detained at the jail with adults. He spoke with
Grogg briefly and concluded that he appeared to be "dazed", but
he advised that Grogg would be appointed an attorney in Fairfax
County. At the hearing, the judge read all of the prisoners their
rights simultaneously although the Florida Rules require that a ju-
venile be engaged in an individual colloquy to ensure understand-
ing of his or her rights. Grogg was returned to the jail and did not
see the public defender again until his extradition hearing on Octo-
ber 28th. Prior to that hearing, two Fairfax County police officers,
accompanied by a Sarasota officer, interrogated Grogg without the
presence of counsel. After being informed of his rights again, he
confessed to his involvement in the Virginia crime.22
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-271 (Cum. Supp. 1989). The amendment does not address the
procedural issue of where such a prosecution will begin. Is it to begin in the juvenile court
with transfer to take place automatically, or is it to commence in the general district court
with a preliminary hearing as for adults?
20. 6 Va. App. 598, 371 S.E.2d 549 (1988).
21. Id. at 602, 371 S.E.2d at 550-51.
22. Id. at 604-05, 371 S.E.2d at 552.
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The court of appeals concluded that Grogg was not denied his
sixth amendment rights when he was interrogated by the Fairfax
officers without the presence of or notice to his court-appointed
counsel since the right to counsel did not attach at the advisory
proceeding as that hearing was not the "initiation of adversary ju-
dicial proceedings."23 The court also found that there was no viola-
tion of his fifth amendment rights considering the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the taking of the statements.2 4 Al-
though a juvenile may waive fifth amendment rights, the Common-
wealth bears a heavy burden in establishing such a waiver. The
fact that his parents, his attorney, or any other interested adult or
guardian were not present also weighs against the validity of the
waiver, but it is only one factor in the totality of the circum-
stances. The court also concluded that the fact that the question-
ing took place in the interrogation room of the jail did not make
the environment coercive, and the youth was in good physical
health and not under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time
of questioning. Grogg had completed the seventh grade, he had one
prior juvenile court appearance, the interrogation only lasted about
an hour, and intelligence tests two years earlier showed that his
cognitive functioning fell within the average range, his verbal com-
prehension was within the low average range, and his perceptual
organizational ability fell within the high average range.2 5 At a pre-
trial suppression hearing in Virginia, Grogg also seemed to under-
stand the advice given him by the Virginia officers in Florida and
knew what his rights were. 6
Finally, the court determined that even if Florida statutes re-
garding the waiver of counsel were violated, this would not render
the confession involuntary, and the Virginia statutes governing
procedures following arrest of a juvenile were not applicable to the
conduct in Florida.2 7
The court's conclusions concerning the admissibility of the state-
ments are disturbing. Using the totality of the circumstances test,
there are several significant factors militating against admissibility
23. Id. at 610-11, 371 S.E.2d at 555.
24. Id. at 617, 371 S.E.2d at 559.
25. Id. at 614, 371 S.E.2d at 557-58.
26. Id. at 615-16, 371 S.E.2d at 558.
27. Id. at 618, 371 at S.E.2d at 559-60.
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of the confession: (1) Grogg was facing a first degree murder
charge; (2) he was fifteen, the lowest age at which transfer for trial
as an adult could take place; (3) he does not appear to be at the
correct grade level for his age, which the intelligence tests indicate
from his low average functioning on "verbal comprehension abil-
ity;"' (4) neither his parents nor any other interested adults were
present (the only member of his family who was even nearby geo-
graphically was his brother who had implicated him); (5) his ap-
pointed counsel, was neither present nor notified of the interroga-
tion;29 (6) there was an apparent violation of the Florida rule
governing the waiver of counsel; and (7) the holding of the juvenile
in an adult jail for detention and interrogation purposes should
have weighed heavily in the equation.30
The court of appeals considered another confession by a juvenile
charged with murder in Smith v. Commonwealth." In Smith, a fif-
teen-year-old was interrogated without his parents being present.
Although his parents were with him when he was arrested, they
did not accompany him to the sheriff's office.32 Smith was advised
of his rights on at least two occasions prior to making a statement.
He was once again advised of his rights prior to a second state-
ment. His parents were present during part of the time he was be-
ing questioned at the sheriff's office although he refused to either
see them or permit them to be present during the interrogation.
The court concluded that the statements were admissible after
"viewing the totality of the circumstances and particular facts dis-
closed by this record ... .
The General Assembly did not amend the juvenile code's delin-
quency provisions very extensively at the 1989 session. One
amendment that was passed provided for the extension of the time
for a detention hearing beyond seventy-two hours, to the next
28. See generally T. GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
COMPETENCE (1981) (raises some important questions regarding the capacity of minors to
waive their rights to counsel or to be protected against self-incrimination).
29. Although the court concluded that Grogg's sixth amendment rights were not violated
by the failure to have counsel present for, or notified of, the interrogation, those failures
should have been major factors in the totality of the circumstances since counsel was in fact
appointed and had interviewed and represented Grogg prior to police questioning.
30. Virginia prohibits the use of an adult jail for the detention of juveniles, and has done
so since 1985. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-249 (Cum. Supp. 1989). See also Shepherd, Legal Issues
Involving Children: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 753, 754-58 (1985).
31. 7 Va. App. 310, 373 S.E.2d 340 (1988).
32. Id. at 312, 373 S.E.2d at 341-42.
33. Id. at 315, 373 S.E.2d at 343.
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court day if the limitation expires on a Saturday, Sunday or other
legal holiday.3 4 Another amendment stated that the predisposi-
tional detention of persons eighteen years of age or older could be
in either a juvenile or adult facility with a preference for the lat-
ter. 5 In addition, the General Assembly set limits on reincarcera-
tion of an adult or juvenile pursuant to a motion to increase bail or
recognizance.36 The General Assembly also raised the maximum
court-appointed fee for attorneys representing indigent juveniles to
$100.3 The category of cases wherein a minor may be treated as a
serious juvenile offender by the juvenile court was increased.3 8 Fi-
nally, there was a required assessment of clerk's fees in cases where
the juvenile is ordered to complete traffic school or a driver im-
provement clinic in lieu of a finding of guilty in a traffic case,39 and
there is a statute which provides for drug testing as a condition of
probation for adults or juveniles. 40
The 1989 legislative session also made some significant changes
in the dispositional authority of the juvenile court with the "abuse
and lose" and automobile curfew amendments to section 16.1-27941
of the Code of Virginia. The so-called "abuse and lose" 42 law pro-
vides for a suspension of the privilege of securing a driver's license
for a juvenile, who is at least thirteen years old with no license, for
at least one year or until reaching the age of seventeen, whichever
is longer, for a first offense. Then for a second or subsequent of-
fense, the suspension lasts until the juvenile's eighteenth birthday
if the juvenile is found to be delinquent as a result of driving while
intoxicated,43 or for refusing to take a blood or breath test,44 and
for the surrender of a driver's license for minors in possession of
such for the same period of time.45 For a child found to be in need
of services because of involvement in the unlawful purchase or pos-
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-250(A) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
35. Id. § 16.1-249(G). This provision primarily applies to those persons within the juris-
diction of the juvenile court because the offense was committed prior to their eighteenth
birthday. Id. § 16.1-241.
36. Id. § 19.2-132.1.
37. Id. § 19.2-163, which must be read in conjunction with section 16.1-266 (Repl. Vol.
1988) of the Code of Virginia.
38. Id. § 16.1-285.1 (Cum. Supp. 1989).'
39. Id. § 14.1-112 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
40. Id. § 19.2-123 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
41. Id. § 16.1-279(E1).
42. Id.
43. Id. § 18.2-266 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
44. Id. § 18.2-268 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
45. Id. § 16.1-279(E1).
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session of alcohol, a six month suspension is levied unless the child
is younger than sixteen, in which event the ability to apply for a
license shall be delayed until six months following the sixteenth
birthday." Various other procedural provisions are also included in
the act. The motor vehicle curfew provision enacted at the 1989
session allows for the imposition of a curfew on the use of a child's
driver's license in lieu of the suspension of such license for delin-
quency and for the issuance of a restricted permit allowing the ju-
venile to drive to and from school or for other purposes.47
One further issue addressed by the court of appeals in Grogg v.
Commonwealth4 was whether a juvenile convicted as an adult by a
circuit court following transfer has an appeal as of right to the
court of appeals because it involved the "control or disposition of a
child. ' 49 The court of appeals concluded that although the pro-
ceeding may initially have been such a case, it lost that character
once the juvenile was convicted of a criminal offense and sentenced
as an adult." The court of appeals specifically reserved the ques-
tion as to whether an appeal could be taken by right if the circuit
court imposed a juvenile disposition rather than an adult sen-
tence.5 1 The General Assembly also provided that when a circuit
court either refers or transfers a case to a juvenile court, the appeal
must be taken to the referring court.52
The confidentiality of juvenile court records continues to raise
troublesome issues for the courts and the General Assembly. The
legislature gave the Commonwealth access to juvenile records in
connection with guilty findings on offenses for which an abstract
must be filed with the Division of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") upon
certification that they are needed for evidentiary purposes in a
pending matter.5 3 The General Assembly also prohibited expunge-
ment of records of juvenile convictions involving DMV reports for
a period of ten years, 54 and allowed for the release of information
46. Id. With the creation of the new jurisdictional categories for noncriminal misbehavior,
the inclusion of the child in need of services in this legislation seems to be far less appropri-
ate than for the child in need of supervision. See id. § 16.1-228.
47. Id. § 16.1-279(E)(6).
48. 6 Va. App. 598, 371 S.E.2d 549 (1988).
49. See VA. CODE ANN. § 17-116.05(3)(e) (Repl. Vol. 1988).
50. 6 Va. App. at 608, 371 S.E.2d at 553-54.
51. Id. at 608 n.4, 371 S.E.2d at 554 n.4.
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-296 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
53. Id. § 16.1-305(D).
54. Id. § 16.1-306(A).
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about a juvenile, before the court on delinquency charges arising
on school property in connection with a school sponsored activity,
where disclosure is made only to school personnel for the purpose
of school disciplinary action. 5 The court of appeals in Scott v.
Commonwealth 6 denied a criminal defendant access to the juve-
nile court files of an adverse witness for impeachment purposes,
since a list of juvenile adjudications were furnished to him and
there was no claim that those adjudications were relevant to im-
peachment on the grounds of bias."
There has been an increasing number of cases around the state,
especially high-profile cases, where the news media has sought ac-
cess to information about juveniles involved in the juvenile justice
process, or access to court hearings. A recent Richmond case in-
volved a motion filed by Richmond Newspapers, Inc., seeking to
examine all the juvenile court's records concerning a deceased ju-
venile who was alleged to be a "hit man" in drug cases, and who
had been the subject of prior articles in the newspaper.58 The juve-
nile court denied access, ruling that the juvenile's right to privacy
and the interests of his surviving child, his mother, and other fam-
ily members outweighed the interests of the news media. 9 On ap-
peal, the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond reached a different
conclusion." The circuit judge concluded that the deceased juve-
nile had no surviving right to privacy and there was no valid rea-
son for shielding the family from disclosure of information about
the juvenile. Although in the normal juvenile case, the court must
balance the juvenile's interest in rehabilitation and being shielded
from the consequences of his acts against society's right to access,
the minor's interests were diminished by his death." Even though
55. Id. § 16.1-309(B).
56. 7 Va. App. 252, 372 S.E.2d 771 (1988).
57. Id. at 259-262, 372 S.E.2d at 775-77. The case was thus distinguished from Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), where the juvenile's prior record was sought to demonstrate
that his testimony was in exchange for leniency in treatment, or other similar matters in-
volving bias.
58. In re Richmond Newspapers, Inc., No. J-21548-11 (Richmond, Jur. & Dom. Rel. Dist.
Ct. Oct. 7, 1988).
59. Id.
60. In re Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 14 Va. Cir. 227 (City of Richmond 1988). Although
neither court cited the opinion, the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), provided a model for an in camera examination
when access is sought to confidential records by a party with a constitutionally protected
interest in such access. See Scott v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. at 261-62, 372 S.E.2d at
776-77 (discussed supra p.713 and notes 56-57).
61. Richmond Newspapers, 14 Va. Cir. at 234-35.
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there may be a further interest in protecting the confidentiality of
persons providing information to the probation officer preparing
the social history, that interest should not be safeguarded by a
blanket prohibition against access. The circuit court thus con-
cluded that the competing interests could best be balanced by an
in camera examination of the records by the juvenile judge and an
individualized determination of which records should be disclosed
or safeguarded.2
As noted previously, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of
capital punishment for juveniles this term, which had been ad-
dressed for persofis under the age of sixteen in Thompson v.
Oklahoma. The Court jointly decided two cases both under the
style of Stanford v. Kentucky.6 4 The first case involved Kevin
Stanford, who was sentenced to death for a murder committed
when he was seventeen years old. The second case dealt with an
appeal by Heath Wilkins, who received a death sentence in Mis-
souri for a homicide when he was sixteen. The Stanford Court con-
cluded that the imposition of the death sentence on persons six-
teen and over, is not a per se violation of the eighth amendment's
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.6 5 Justice
Scalia, writing for the four member majority, stated that since cap-
ital punishment for juveniles was not considered cruel and unusual
at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, the Court must con-
sider whether the "evolving standards of decency" in the United
States treat death as inappropriate for such defendants today.6 6 Of
the thirty-seven states that allow capital punishment, twenty-two
permit its imposition on sixteen-year-olds and twenty-five will al-
low it for seventeen-year-olds. This tally does not "establish the
degree of national consensus this Court has previously thought suf-
ficient to label a particular punishment cruel and unusual. ' 67 Jus-
tice O'Connor, as in last year's Thompson case, provided the deci-
sive fifth vote, this time in favor of death. Although she agreed
with Scalia that there was no strong national consensus against
capital punishment for older minors, she disagreed with his view
that age-based statutory classifications were irrelevant to an eighth
62. Id. at 235.
63. 108 S.Ct. 2687 (1988); see also Shepherd, Legal Issues Involving Children: Annual
Survey of Virginia Law, 22 U. Ricm. L. REv. 691, 703 (1988).
64. 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989).
65. Id. at 2980.
66. Id. at 2974
67. Id. at 2975-76.
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amendment proportionality analysis.6 8 Brennan wrote a dissenting
opinion for Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and himself, arguing that
an examination of state statutes must include an assessment of the
consensus in those states prohibiting capital punishment, as well as
the consensus of Congress, which declined to include juveniles in
its most recent death penalty enactment.6 9 The dissent also ex-
amined the views of other nations and respected national organiza-
tions who filed amicus curiae briefs in support of the petitioners,
as well as various age-based legislative classifications. In addition,
the dissent examined data and studies concerning the maturity of
minors, the characteristics of juveniles on death rows in the coun-
try, the questions of the blameworthiness and culpability of minors
for their criminal acts, and the reduced deterrence value of the
death sentence for adolescents. 0 When coupled with Thompson,
the conclusion is inescapable that death is a constitutionally per-
missible punishment for juveniles over fifteen, at least until there
is some consistent national trend against minors that creates a new
and different consensus persuasive to Justice O'Connor, assuming
the same composition of the Court.
B. Noncriminal Misbehavior
The General Assembly this spring concluded its work on Vir-
ginia's "children in need of services" jurisdictional category that
was begun in 1987."' Since the 1988 legislative session, a joint legis-
lative subcommittee has continued to examine the problems
presented by children who have committed no act that would be
criminal if committed by an adult, and yet have engaged in behav-
iors that are generally disapproved by society-runaways, truants,
and the like. That subcommittee reported to the 1989 General As-
sembly and legislation was enacted embodying its
recommendations.
On July 1, 1989, the prior category of "child in need of ser-
vices"72 will be separated into two categories, the "child in need of
68. Id. at 2982.
69. Id. at 2982-83. Brennan's analysis would thus array 26 states and the District of Co-
lumbia against death for 17-year-olds and 29 states and the District in opposition to capital
punishment for those who were 16 years old at the commission of the offense.
70. Id. at 2984-994.
71. See Shepherd, Legal Issues Involving Children: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 21
U. RICH. L. REv. 789 (1987).
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (RepI. Vol. 1988).
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services" and the "child in need of supervision. '73 The "services"
child is now one "whose behavior, conduct or condition presents or
results in a serious threat to the well-being and physical safety of
the child '74 but not a child who is being treated by spiritual means
or a runaway from home because of physical, emotional or sexual
abuse. The new "supervision" child is defined as one who is habit-
ually truant without justification, provided the child has been of-
fered an adequate opportunity to receive the benefit of any and all
required educational services which meet the child's particular
needs and the school system has made a reasonable effort to effect
the child's regular attendance without success.75 Also, the new "su-
pervision" child is defined as a child who is a habitual runaway
from either home or a residential care facility without consent or
authority, and such conduct presents a clear and substantial dan-
ger to the child's life or health, the child or family is in need of
treatment, rehabilitation or services are not presently received, and
the court's intervention is essential to provide the services.
76
Neither classification includes the prior categories of the "child
who is habitually disobedient of the reasonable and lawful com-
mands of his or her" parents nor the "child who commits an of-
fense which would not be criminal if committed by an adult. 77
The intake section of the Code of Virginia was amended to pro-
hibit the filing of a "services" or "supervision" petition by an at-
torney. That section also states that an intake officer may refuse to
file such a petition if there is no probable cause, if the authoriza-
tion of a petition is not in the best interest of the family or child,
73. Id. § 16.1-228 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
74. Id. This was category 5 of the previous definition of a child in need of services. In
order to be classified as such, there must also be findings that the conduct in question
presents a clear and substantial danger to the child's life or health or the child or family is
in need of treatment, rehabilitation or services not being received, and the intervention of
the court is essential to provide the needed services. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. Note that the conjunction "and" is used here between the nature of the conduct
and the child or parent's need of services unlike in the "services" category where "or" is the
link.
77. The second, pure "status offense," category may have been unintentionally omitted as
it eliminates juvenile court jurisdiction over enforcement of local curfew ordinances and the
like and over purchase or possession of tobacco products. The definition of "delinquent act"
still excludes "an act, which is otherwise lawful, but is designated a crime only if committed
by a child." Id. § 16.1-228 (Cum. Supp. 1989). The enforcement of such provisions would
now seem to fall in the General District Court, a curious anomaly as it would be the only
instance of that court's jurisdiction over a juvenile, or these pure "status offenses" are unen-
forceable anywhere.
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or if the matter may be effectively dealt with by some agency other
than the court.78 The same section requires the exhaustion of avail-
able treatment or services and all appropriate nonjudicial remedies
before the intake officer can file a "supervision" petition, however,
it states that when the officer determines that the parties have
made a reasonable effort to utilize such community services, he
"shall permit the petition to be filed. '79 Limitations on the use of
detention for both "services" and "supervision" children are re-
tained, 0 and the right to counsel is preserved for both jurisdic-
tional categories.81
The amendments retain the court's dispositional alternatives
over "services" children except for the deletion of probation as an
option,82 but an entirely new dispositional scheme is introduced for
the "supervision" child. 3 Before disposition for the adjudicated
"supervision" child, the court must direct an appropriate public
agency to evaluate the child's service needs using an interdiscipli-
nary team approach.8 4 The interdisciplinary team should include
the local department of social services, the community services
board, the schools, the court service unit, and other appropriate
public and private agencies. The team must file a written report
for the court and counsel8 5 The court may then utilize any disposi-
tion available for a "services" child, and may order probation or
the participation by the child and parents in rehabilitative pro-
grams., Further, the court must give the child written notice of the
possible consequences of violating the dispositional order.86
The most controversial aspect of the new statutory scheme in-
volves the so-called "valid court order" provision, outlining the
power of the court to deal with violations of its dispositional or-
der.87 If a "services" child willfully and materially violates the
court's dispositional order for a second or subsequent time, the
court may suspend the child's driver's license or pursuant to sec-
78. Id. § 16.1-260 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
79. Id. § 16.1-260(B1). There is thus an apparent conflict between the intake officer's
discretion in subsection B and the limitation on that discretion in B1.
80. Id. § 16.1-248.1. The code now makes explicit in this section the judge's power to
punish for summary contempt.
81. Id. § 16.1-266(B).
82. Id. § 16.1-279(C).
83. Id. § 16.1-279(C1).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. § 16.1-294(D), (E).
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tion 16.1-279(E)(6) of the Code of Virginia,"" impose a driving cur-
few. 9 If a "supervision" child willfully and materially violates the
dispositional order, even for the first time, the court may suspend
the driver's license, or order a child fourteen years of age or older
to be placed in a foster home, group home or nonsecure residential
facility; or, if it finds such a nonsecure placement unlikely to meet
the child's needs, that all other treatment options in the commu-
nity have been exhausted, and that placement in a secure facility is
necessary to meet the child's service needs, the court may detain
the child in a detention home for no more than thirty consecutive
days."
This comprehensive statutory plan for addressing noncriminal
behavior is not without controversy, and the legislative subcommit-
tee heard a number of conflicting views on the appropriateness of
using secure facilities to house status offenders. 91 The approach
taken is sometimes referred to as a "gatekeeping" approach since it
allows for a more severe handling of youths who violate court or-
ders, but it also establishes strict criteria to narrow the gate
through which a youth may pass, or be pushed, to be subject to
these serious consequences. The legislative subcommittee also in-
sisted that further studies be undertaken of the minimum level of
services that should be available in each community for children
who are at risk, and of the means for funding such services.2
II. ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER CARE AND TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS
In Vaughan v. Commonwealth,9" the court of appeals reversed
the conviction of a sixteen-year-old mother for the first degree
murder of her newborn infant. The court concluded that the "sole
fact that . . [a mother] ...has recently experienced childbirth
does not excuse her from a legal duty to care for the baby,"9 4 but
there was insufficient evidence to establish that the teenage mother
88. Id. § 16.1-279(E)(6).
89. Id. § 16.1-292(D).
90. Id. The court must express all the necessary findings in the order and the multidis-
ciplinary team must be reconvened to reevaluate the child and develop further treatment
plans. Such an order is treated as final and appealable to the circuit court.
91. See Shepherd, supra note 71, at 790.
92. H.R.J. Res. 414, Va. General Assembly, 1989 Sess. (1989).
93. 7 Va. App. 665, 376 S.E.2d 801 (1989).
94. Id. at 670, 376 S.E.2d at 804.
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"acted with malice, willfulness, deliberation, or premeditation."95
In another case, a conviction of a mother for the aggravated sexual
battery of her daughter was overturned for an improper comment
by the commonwealth on her post-arrest, post-Miranda silence.
The court also noted the error committed by the trial judge in re-
fusing to allow the defendant's seven-year-old son to testify for the
defense regarding duress by his father. The court opined that the
record demonstrated the child's understanding of the obligation to
tell the truth, and the trial judge's exclusion of the boy as a wit-
ness was improperly predicated on credibility and not compe-
tency. 97 In Garland v. Commonwealth,98 the court again reversed
an aggravated sexual battery conviction, this time because the trial
judge improperly admitted evidence of a recent complaint by the
victim to a school counselor to bolster her credibility, and the ad-
missibility of such evidence is limited to rape and attempted rape
cases. Convictions for sodomy, statutory rape, aggravated sexual
battery, and taking indecent liberties with a minor were affirmed
in MacKenzie v. Commonwealth,99 against claims of collateral es-
toppel or double jeopardy, and suppression of allegedly exculpa-
tory evidence arguments.
The Supreme Court of the United States dealt a blow to those
who seek to invoke federal civil rights remedies to force public pro-
tective services agencies to act to protect abused children in
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Social Services.100 In DeShaney,
the department of social services took no action to intervene on
behalf of Joshua DeShaney, even though there were multiple re-
ports of abuse by his father. Joshua ultimately suffered a beating
that resulted in a coma and brain damage so severe as to result in
probable institutionalization, with profound retardation for the re-
mainder of his life.1 1 Joshua's mother filed suit alleging that the
social services department had deprived him of his liberty under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment by failing to
protect him against physical harm. Her suit was dismissed at trial
and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme
Court affirmed that ruling. The decision was narrow, concluding
95. Id. at 678, 376 S.E.2d at 807.
96. Durant v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 454, 375 S.E.2d 396 (1988).
97. Id. at 466-67, 375 S.E.2d at 402.
98. 8 Va. App. 189, 379 S.E.2d 146 (1989).
99. 8 Va. App. 236, 380 S.E.2d 173 (1989).
100. 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
101. Id. at 1001-02.
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that no federal constitutional right was violated since Joshua was
not in the custody of the agency, and there was thus no affirmative
duty of care and protection. 102 Justices Brennan, Marshall and
Blackmun dissented. 03 DeShaney had an immediate impact in the
Fourth Circuit, when the court of appeals affirmed dismissal of a
suit against a local department of social services in Maryland, state
foster parents, and others for abuse to a child voluntarily placed in
foster care by his parents. 10 4 The court could easily have distin-
guished DeShaney because of the out-of-home custody in a state-
approved foster home, but it declined to do so. That refusal is
somewhat ironic as the Supreme Court refused certiorari in a re-
cent Fourth Circuit case, L.J. v. Massinga.10 5 In Massinga, the
court held that foster children might pursue damage claims against
public welfare officials who fail to ensure the provision of proper
care while in state foster homes.0 6
A mother fared somewhat better in the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia, when the court held that the state recognized a tort of negli-
gent hiring. 10 7 The Supreme Court of Virginia also held that the
trial court erred in sustaining a demurrer to an amended motion
for judgment alleging that a church was negligent in hiring an em-
ployee recently convicted of aggravated sexual battery of a young
girl, thus exposing the plaintiff's daughter to similar sexual as-
saults while he was in the church's employ.108
In Massachusetts v. Oakes,10 9 the Supreme Court of the United
States reversed and remanded a Massachusetts decision overturn-
ing the conviction of a father for taking color photographs of his
partially nude and physically mature fourteen-year-old stepdaugh-
ter for overbreadth of a statute, after concluding that the posing of
the child was speech for first amendment purposes.
General Assembly action broadened the types of child abuse or
neglect cases for which a local department of social services must
102. Id. at 1003-06.
103. Id. at 1007.
104. Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dept. of Social Servs., 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1989).
105. 838 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 816 (1989). The denial of certio-
rari was contrary to the recommendation of the Solicitor General and was followed by set-
tlement of the lawsuit for $800,000 in the district court. See L.J. v. Massinga, 699 F. Supp.
508 (D. Md. 1988).
106. Massinga, 838 F.2d at 123-24.
107. J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church, 236 Va. 206, 372 S.E.2d 391 (1988).
108. Id. at 210-11, 372 S.E.2d at 394.
109. 109 S. Ct. 2633 (1989).
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report to the Commonwealth's Attorney,110 allowed the transmittal
of information about child abuse or neglect complaints or investi-
gations from departments of social services to family advocacy rep-
resentatives of the armed forces, 1 and provided for the use of in-
dependent living arrangements for older adolescents by child-
placing agencies.11 2 The 1989 legislative session also created a joint
subcommittee to evaluate the feasibility of establishing a statewide
Court Appointed Special Advocate ("CASA") Program in the
state. 3
III. CHILD CUSTODY AND ADOPTION
A. Child Custody
The number of child custody cases decided by the Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia declined drastically this year, as there were no
cases dealing with custody in a divorce or other domestic relations
setting. However, there was one case that presented a custody issue
in an unusual criminal law context. In Bennett v. Common-
wealth,114 a mother and her boyfriend were convicted of abducting
her twin daughters from the custody of her in-laws where they had
been placed by their father who had been awarded custody. The
action of the father in transferring physical custody to his parents
gave them superior custodial rights against the mother and the
taking of the children was from one "lawfully entitled to ...
[their] . . .charge.' 1 5 The court interpreted section 18.2-47 of the
Code of Virginia so as to apply only to those cases in which the
person abducted is taken to another state."'
Two significant reported circuit court decisions" 7 decided during
the past year have concluded that the application of a "primary
caretaker" rule would be contrary to state law and that religious
affiliations of the parents generally should not be weighed heavily
110. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.6(D)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
111. Id. §§ 2.1-380, 63.1-248.6.
112. Id. §§ 63.1-195, -205.
113. H.R.J. Res. 261, Va. Gen. Assembly, 1989 Sess. (1989). This program exists in a num-
ber of other states and in several Virginia localities. It most often involves the designation of
a volunteer guardian, or "Court Appointed Special Advocate" to assist the attorney serving
as guardian ad litem in investigating the case and monitoring the disposition.
114. 8 Va. App. 228, 380 S.E.2d 17 (1989).
115. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-47 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
116. 8 Va. App. at 235, 380 S.E.2d at 21.
117. In re Nichols, 14 Va. Cir. 341 (City of Roanoke 1989); Crute v. Crute, 12 Va. Cir. 190
(Henrico County 1988).
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in the custody decision, l"" and that evidence in custody cases nor-
mally should be heard by a judge rather than by an advisory
jury. 119
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had to deal with the
application of the Indian Child Welfare Act 120 to custody matters
in In re Larch,121 where there were competing decrees between a
North Carolina court granting custody to the non-Indian mother in
a 1983 divorce and a Cherokee Indian Court awarding custody to
the father in a 1987 order. The Indian Child Welfare Act is not
applicable to the situation as it expressly excludes custody provi-
sions in divorce decrees from its ambit,122 and thus a writ of habeas
corpus will not lie.
General Assembly custody actions were also minimal as the leg-
islature gave juvenile courts, to which a case had been transferred
for enforcement, the same power to transfer venue in custody,
maintenance, and support cases, as in cases originally brought in
the court. 123 The General Assembly also affirmed that juvenile
courts have the jurisdiction to enforce their valid orders prior to
the entry of a conflicting circuit court order in matters where there
is concurrent jurisdiction for any period of time during which the
order was in effect. 24 Further, the General Assembly clarified the
parental abduction offense by providing that it applied to an un-
lawful withholding of a child from a custodial parent "outside the
Commonwealth," thus widening its application to international ab-
ductions, as well as those in other states. 28
B. Adoption
The Virginia General Assembly made important changes in the
ability of persons to participate in private adoptions at the 1989
118. Crute v. Crute, 12 Va. Cir. 190 (Henrico County 1988). The "primary caretaker rule"
would give a preference to, or create a presumption in favor of, the parent who has been the
primary caretaker for the children during the course of the marriage. See 2 CLARK, THE LAW
OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 499 (2d ed. 1987); Chambers, Rethinking the
Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1984).
119. In re Nichols, 14 Va. Cir. 341 (City of Roanoke 1989).
120. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1982).
121. 872 F.2d 66 (4th Cir. 1989).
122. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1).
123. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-243 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
124. Id. § 16.1-244.
125. Id. § 18.2-49.1.
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Session. House Bill 1491126 still allows the birth parents to place a
child for adoption directly with adoptive parents, but there is a
requirement for the acceptance of consent to such an adoption by
a juvenile and domestic relations district court with extensive in-
quiries to be made. 127 There are also stringent limitations on the
fees that may be paid in connection with an adoption. 128
In Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,129 the Su-
preme Court ruled that the term "domicile," within the meaning of
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978,130 is defined by federal
rather than state law, and thus a Mississippi adoption decree plac-
ing native American twins with persons to whom the mother gave
them after their birth was invalid. The mother and father in
Holyfield were domiciled on the Choctaw Reservation, but the
mother gave birth off the reservation to circumvent the provisions
of the Act.' 3 ' The Act was passed to deal with the growing problem
of Native American children being separated from their families
and tribes and being placed in non-Indian tribes through foster
care, termination of parental rights and adoption. 13 2
Although there will be a more extensive discussion of the case in
the following section, it is best to note here that the Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia held in NPA v. WBA 13 s that Virginia does not
recognize common law adoption.
IV. PATERNITY AND ILLEGITIMACY
There were several major decisions handed down by the Su-
preme Court of Virginia and the Court of Appeals of Virginia this
past year in the paternity area. As noted above, NPA v. WBA 134
dealt with several important issues. In a divorce proceeding, the
trial court ordered the parents to submit to human leukocyte anti-
gen ("HLA") blood testing to determine paternity. Those tests es-
tablished conclusively that the husband was not the biological fa-
126. Id. §§ 63.1-195, -204, -220 to 221, -223, -225 to 226, -228, -238.01 to 238.02. Individu-
als participating in any direct placement for adoption should review these amended and new
sections carefully before proceeding.
127. Id. § 63.1-220.3(B)(4).
128. Id. § 63.1-220.4.
129. 109 S. Ct, 1597 (1989).
130. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1982).
131. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1602.
132. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1902.
133. 8 Va. App. 246, 380 S.E.2d 178 (1989).
134. 8 Va. App. 246, 380 S.E.2d 178 (1989).
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ther of the five-year-old son, but he was of the three-year-old
daughter. The court then ruled that the husband was not liable for
support of the son. The court of appeals rejected the wife's argu-
ment that the husband was liable on theories of common law adop-
tion, in loco parentis, implied contract, and equitable estoppel,
concluding that these doctrines do not establish a relationship ob-
ligating a husband to support the wife's illegitimate child in
Virginia.13 5
In Ruth v. Fletcher,l'3 the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded
that a former putative father could not recover in tort for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress against the mother when she
cut off visitation rights and proved through HLA testing that he
was not the father. A son fared better in Murphy v. Holland13 7
when he was declared the sole heir of a decedent who died intes-
tate while owning land. Although Virginia does not recognize com-
mon law marriages contracted in the state, the court held that such
a marriage is one "null in law" within the meaning of section 64-7
of the Code of Virginia (which is currently section 20.31.1138 of the
Code of Virginia) and the son is therefore entitled to a declaration
of legitimacy pursuant to that provision.13 9
In Commonwealth v. Johnson,140 the court of appeals ruled that
the doctrine of res judicata may bar a mother from reasserting a
claim for civil child support which has been previously decided
against her,' 4 ' but that a prior decision is not res judicata with re-
spect to a claim brought on behalf of the child by the Division of
Child Support Enforcement. The Johnson court ruled that the
mother and child are not deemed to be in privity, and the child
will not be bound by a determination of non-paternity, "unless the
child is formally named a party, represented by a guardian ad li-
tern and given an adequate opportunity to litigate the issue. "142
The rights of an illegitimate child were similarly protected in Bird-
song Peanut Co. v. Cowling, 43 wherein the court ruled that a puta-
135. Id. at 251-54, 380 S.E.2d at 180-82.
136. 237 Va. 366, 377 S.E.2d 412 (1989).
137. 237 Va. 212, 377 S.E.2d 363 (1989).
138. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-31.1 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
139. Murphy, 237 Va. at 217-20, 377 S.E.2d at 366-68.
140. 7 Va. App. 614, 376 S.E.2d 787 (1989).
141. See also Walters v. Cheagle, 14 Va. Cir. 123 (Henrico County 1988) (a finding of a
juvenile and domestic relations court on the issue of paternity is res judicata).
142. Johnson, 7 Va. App. at 621, 376 S.E.2d at 790.
143. 8 Va. App. 274, 381 S.E.2d 24 (1989).
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tive father's pre-birth acknowledgement of the child may establish
dependency for workers' compensation benefit purposes.
In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,'" the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a California statute creating a conclusive pre-
sumption that a woman's husband is the father of her children, if
he is living with her and is neither sterile nor impotent, even
though blood tests established paternity by another man. Justice
Stevens concurred, agreeing that there may be "a constitutionally
protected relationship between a natural father and his child" but
that relationship may be asserted through a request for visitation
rights under other provisions of California law.14 5 Justices Black-
mun, Brennan, Marshall and White dissented, urging that the pu-
tative father should at least have a right to a hearing at which he
could prove his paternity.' 46
The General Assembly gave the circuit court and the juvenile
and domestic relations court concurrent jurisdiction over proceed-
ings to determine parentage,'4 7 and decided to mandate blood test-
ing in any parentage case in which child support is in issue. 148
V. EDUCATION
A. Educational Rights of the Handicapped
The Supreme Court of United States ruled in Dellmuth v.
Muth149 that the Education of the Handicapped Act'5" does not
explicitly abrogate the eleventh amendment's assertion of state im-
munity from suit in the federal courts and that the child's parents
are not entitled to collect tuition reimbursement against the state
of Pennsylvania.' 5' There were four justices who dissented from
the Court's ruling. 5
2
144. 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
145. Id. at 2347.
146. Id. at 2358-59.
147. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-241, 20-49.2 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
148. Id. § 20-49.3.
149. 109 S. Ct. 2397 (1989).
150. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
151. One interesting aspect to the case is that the district court found that the offered
educational program was appropriate, but that there were procedural flaws which made
both the local and state educational agencies liable for reimbursement of tuition costs.
Neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court disturbed the award against the local
school division.
152. Deilmuth, 109 S. Ct. at 2403.
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In Child v. Spillane,153 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit concluded that a child with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syn-
drome ("AIDS") was not a "prevailing party," within the meaning
of the Rehabilitation Act 54 for the purpose of awarding attorney's
fees when a medical committee recommended readmission of the
child to school after the filing of a federal lawsuit. 15 5 A significantly
different approach was taken in DeVries v. Spillane5 6 where the
court found that the district court had improperly dismissed a suit
seeking review of administrative proceedings regarding educational
placement of a handicapped child. The child's mother wanted him
educated in his neighborhood school rather than at the residential
school where he was previously placed, and she sought court review
of the administrative rulings that the youth should remain at the
residential school. While the court proceeding was pending, the
county initiated efforts to remove the child from the residential
facility and place him in a public school, but still one other than
the neighborhood school. The mother still objected but did not ini-
tiate administrative hearings to review that decision, instead insist-
ing that her son remain where he was while she pursued the court
proceeding. The district court sua sponte dismissed the action,
contending that Devries had to exhaust his administrative reme-
dies. '5 The court of appeals disagreed, concluding that the
mother's position had not changed from her original suit-no
placement was appropriate but the neighborhood school-and the
district court should have entertained the case addressing that
claim.15
In Spielberg v. Henrico County Public Schools,59 the court
ruled that the county had violated the procedural requirements of
the Education of the Handicapped Act 60 by predetermining a
placement for the child prior to the meeting with the parents to
establish an individualized education program ("IEP"), and the
child should remain in his current placement. The Supreme Court
of Virginia concluded in School Board of Campbell County v.
153. 866 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1989).
154. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (1982).
155. Judge Murnaghan dissented, concluding that the "district court did not clearly err in
finding that the child's lawsuit contributed to her readmission to kindergarten." 866 F.2d at
696.
156. 853 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1988).
157. Id. at 265.
158. Id. at 266.
159. 853 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1988).
160. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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Beasley 6' that the court of appeals had erred in reversing the trial
court's decision because it essentially reweighed the evidence
before the circuit court. The supreme court did note that "the bur-
den of proof in inquiries concerning free appropriate public educa-
tion lies with the school board." '162
One of the more troublesome cases before the Supreme Court of
Virginia this year involved the attack on the prohibition against
corporal punishment in Virginia's "core standards" governing the
licensure and regulation of residential facilities for children in the
state. In Cullum v. Faith Mission Home,63 the court affirmed a
circuit court ruling exempting the home from licensure by the state
due to its character as a religious facility operated by the Beachy
Amish Mennonite Church. Since the court found that the home
was ministering to its mentally retarded residents by the use of
spiritual means, the home is exempt from licensure and the restric-
tions included within licensure.64
B. Other Educational Issues
In Crosby v. Holsinger,'65 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit upheld the district court's decision in favor of a high school
principal who removed the school's "Johnny Reb" mascot symbol
as offensive to black students at the school. Under recent Supreme
Court decisions "school authorities have the authority to disassoci-
ate the school from controversial speech even if it may limit stu-
dent expression."' 6 A federal district court held in Croteau v.
Fair'117 that a female high school student who was cut from the
school's varsity baseball team did not prove that the decision was
motivated by gender bias.
The Supreme Court of Virginia concluded in Lentz v. Morris168
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity protects a high school
physical education teacher from an action based on simple negli-
161. 6 Va. App. 206, 367 S.E.2d 738 (1988), rev'd 238 Va. 44, 380 S.E.2d 884 (1989).
162. Id. at 51, 380 S.E.2d at 889.
163. 237 Va. 473, 379 S.E.2d 445 (1989).
164. 237 Va. at 482-83, 379 S.E.2d at 450; see VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-188 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
165. 852 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1988).
166. Id. at 803. The court relied on Hazlewood School Dist. v. Kuhimeier, 108 S. Ct. 562
(1988); Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
167. 686 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Va. 1988).
168. 236 Va. 78, 372 S.E.2d 608 (1988).
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gence brought by a student injured in the class.'69
Legislation affecting education passed at the 1989 session of the
General Assembly included amendments to the criminal code
strengthening the prohibitions against the sale or distribution of
drugs on or near school property or while on a school bus,170 the
enactment of a prohibition against the possession of "beepers" on
school property after admonitions to leave, 17 ' amendments broad-
ening the restrictions against trespasses on school property,12 and
further amendments to the family life curricula which also include
raising the compulsory school attendance age to eighteen.7 3 An
important new law prohibits the use of corporal punishment in the
schools of the Commonwealth, making Virginia the first Southern
state to ban school paddling. 74
VI. MISCELLANEOUS
The Supreme Court upheld an ordinance in City of Dallas v.
Stanglin17 5 that segregated teenagers in dance halls that bar adults
other than parents and employees. In reversing the Court of Ap-
peals of Texas that struck down the law for interfering with the
first amendment associational rights of young people, the Court
ruled that the only rights infringed are those of limited social asso-
ciation and of such a chance encounter basis as to escape first
amendment protection. 176 There was also no equal protection prob-
lem with the classification which readily survives the rational basis
scrutiny. 77 In Brock v. Wendell's Woodwork, Inc.,'1 8 the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the application of statutory
bans against child labor and the wage-hour provision of federal law
169. The Court expressly overruled its prior decisions in Crabbe v. School Board, 209 Va.
356, 164 S.E.2d 639 (1968) and Short v. Griffitts, 220 Va. 53, 255 S.E.2d 479 (1979), which
held the contrary. Chief Justice Carrico and Justice Stephenson dissented.
170. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-255.2 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
171. Id. § 18.2-322.1.
172. Id. § 18.2-128.
173. Id. §§ 22.1-207.2, -254.
174. Id. § 22.1-279.1. The legislation excludes from the prohibition reasonable force nec-
essary in order to maintain order and control, to quell disturbances, to prevent a student
from inflicting physical harm on himself or others, in self-defense by the teacher or school
official, and to obtain possession of weapons, dangerous objects, or controlled substances or
paraphernalia.
175. 109 S. Ct. 1591 (1989).
176. Id. at 1595.
177. Id. at 1595-97.
178. 867 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1989).
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against religious free exercise claims by commercial businesses op-
erated largely by members of a religious sect. Some of the jobs at
which children in the sect were employed were hazardous and pro-
scribed for children by federal laws intended for their protection.
The long journey of Commonwealth v. American Booksellers As-
sociation, Inc.179 continued as the Supreme Court of Virginia an-
swered questions certified to it by the United States Supreme
Court regarding a statute, regulating access of minors to materials
harmful to them, by concluding that a book would pass muster if it
had serious value for a legitimate minority of juveniles, that the
specific books presented as examples in the litigation passed mus-
ter under the law,8 0 and that there is a scienter element in the
prohibition against displaying books in such a fashion that
juveniles may peruse them.''
The General Assembly took the first of two important steps to-
ward the future by approving legislation establishing experimental
family courts in several jurisdictions in the Commonwealth, effec-
tive January 1, 1990, to test the efficacy of such a judicial structure
with the Judicial Council of Virginia to study the operation of the
experimental courts and report back to the General Assembly and
Governor by December 31, 1992.182 The second step was in the cre-
ation of a Youth Services Commission to come into existence on
July 1, 1990, consisting of four members of the House of Delegates,
two Senators, and two citizen members to address the needs of,
and services to, youth in the Commonwealth and make recommen-
dations to the legislature and state agencies concerning such.8 3
179. 236 Va. 168, 372 S.E.2d 618 (1988).
180. Id. at 174-75, 372 S.E.2d at 622 (The books in question ranged from J. BLUME, FOR-
EVER .... (1975), J. JOYCE, ULYSSES (1961), and THE PENGUIN BOOK OF LOVE POETRY (J.
Stallworthy ed. 1973) to J. COLLINS, HOLLYWOOD WIVES (1983)).
181. The statute had been struck down by the federal district court in 617 F. Supp. 699
(E.D. Va. 1985), a decision affirmed by the court of appeals at 802 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1986).
The Supreme Court of the United States had certified questions to the Supreme Court of
Virginia in its January 1988 opinion reported at 108 S. Ct. 636 (1988).
182. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-241.1, -296.1, 17-116.05:5, 20-96.1 to 96.2 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
183. Id. §§ 9-281 to 285 (Repl. Vol. 1989). The Act also provides for the appointment of
an executive director and staff to aid the commission in carrying out its duties.
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